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What is behind the priority heuristic?: a mathematical analysis
and comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006)
Abstract
Comments on the article by E. Brandstätter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig. The authors discuss the
priority heuristic, a recent model for decisions under risk. They reanalyze the experimental validity of
this approach and discuss how these results compare with cumulative prospect theory, the currently
most established model in behavioral economics. They also discuss how general models for decisions
under risk based on a heuristic approach can be understood mathematically to gain some insight in their
limitations. They finally consider whether the priority heuristic model can lead to some understanding of
the decision process of individuals or whether it is better seen as an as-if model. 
What is behind the Priority Heuristic?
A Mathematical Analysis
Marc Oliver Rieger∗ and Mei Wang†
August 12, 2006
Abstract
We discuss the “priority heuristic”, a recent model for decisions under
risk. We re-analyse the experimental validity of this approach and discuss
how these results compare to Cumulative Prospect Theory, the currently most
established model in behavioral economics. We also discuss how general
models for decisions under risk based on a heuristic approach can be under-
stood mathematically to gain some insight in their limitations. We finally
consider whether the priority heuristic model can lead to some understand-
ing of the decision process of individuals or whether it is better seen as an
“as-if” model.
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1 A closer look on the Priority Heuristic
We consider a model for decisions under risk that has recently been suggested
by Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig (2006). This model gives a simple heuris-
tic (called “priority heuristic”) for the decision process between two given lotteries.
The results in Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) suggest strongly that this simple heuristic
is equal if not superior to the best descriptive “as-if” models for decisions under
risk. It even seems to outperform Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) as introduced
in Tversky & Kahneman (1992), which is nowadays the most widely used descrip-
tive model. In this short article we want to have a closer look at this surprising
result.
We start with a summary of the priority heuristic. Let us consider two lot-
teries X and Y . The lottery X has the outcomes x1, . . . , xm with probabilities
p1, . . . , pm, respectively. The lottery Y has the outcomes y1, . . . , yn with prob-
abilities q1, . . . , qn, respectively. We assume that the outcomes are ordered, i.e.
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2 1 A CLOSER LOOK ON THE PRIORITY HEURISTIC
x1 < x2 < · · · < xm and y1 < y2 < · · · < yn. The algorithm underlying the priority
heuristic is the following1:
1. If 110 |max{xm, yn}| < x1 − y1 then choose lottery X.
If 110 |max{xm, yn}| < y1 − x1 then choose lottery Y .
Otherwise, proceed with step 2.
2. If p1 > q1 + 110 , then choose Y .
If q1 > p1 + 110 , then choose X.
Otherwise, proceed with step 3.
3. If xm > yn then choose lottery X.
If xn > ym then choose lottery Y .
More precisely, in each step computations are performed such that the lowest num-
ber which is “natural” in a certain psychological sense is used (i.e. only the num-
bers 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, . . . ). Since this is not an essential point for our discussion, and
it would lead to more complicated formulae, we do not consider this.
We illustrate the model on three examples:
Example 1. We compare the following lotteries X and Y:
X =
outcome 0 1 10
probability 1/3 1/3 1/3
and Y =
outcome 0 9 10
probability 1/3 1/3 1/3
.
The first step of the algorithm compares 110 |max{x3, y3}| = 1 with the difference
of x1 and y1 which is zero. Hence, no decision is made.
The second step of the algorithm compares the probabilities p1 and q1. Since
they are identical, no decision is made.
In the last step, we finally look at the highest outcomes. Since both are the
same, no conclusion is reached. This could be interpreted as indifference.









The first step of the algorithm compares 110 |max{x2, y1}| = 10 with y1−x1 = 20.
Since the latter is larger, the lottery Y is selected.








1We present the algorithm in an abbreviated version using mathematical notation. A more elo-
quent presentation can be found in the original paper (Brandsta¨tter et al. 2006).
3Following the same method, the reader can check easily that X is preferred over
Y . (The algorithm terminates in the second step.)
The predictions of these three examples seem slightly counterintuitive. In fact,
we would not expect to observe them in experiments, but worse, in the first and
third example, most people would not even consider the suggested decision.
The grossest miss-prediction, the third example, can be rejected by arguing
that only “nontrivial” lotteries are admitted to the heuristic. Brandsta¨tter et al.
(2006) are not very clear on what kind of lotteries and choices are considered, but
at least state explicitly that dominating cases are excluded from the application of
the heuristic. This is a strong restriction, since these should be the “simplest” cases
for a heuristic. To exclude the first example from consideration, we also have to
assume that all cases of stochastic dominance are excluded as “trivial”, as was also
suggested by Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006). However, there seems to be no simple way
to exclude the second example from consideration.
Nevertheless the priority heuristic seems to work very well when used for gen-
eral experimental data, according to the results presented in Brandsta¨tter et al.
(2006). How can we explain this discrepancy? Are the initial examples just excep-
tions without any significance to the overall validity of the theory? Indeed these are
not simply exotic or opportunistic counter-examples. To test the predictive validity
of the priority heuristic, one should go beyond the available experimental data, but
look at the more “global” environment. To this aim, let us have a closer look on
the experimental tests in Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006). In all cases, predictions of the
priority heuristic (and competing models) about preferences on selected lotteries
have been compared to the majority choices of test persons. Then the number of
correct predictions has been measured. This seems at first glance a fair comparison
and the priority heuristic scores extremely well in this test.
There is, however, a problem in this approach: the selection of these lotteries.
How can this be? The lotteries have been taken from other studies that aimed to
show the descriptive power of the competing theories; Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006)
describe this as a test in a “hostile environment”. Although this seems very con-
vincing, there is a flaw in this line of argument.
We first need to understand the selection process for these lotteries, since all the
lotteries have been selected in order to satisfy certain conditions: first of all, there
are no lotteries with “obvious” choices, where one lottery is clearly dominating
the other (our first example) or where all outcomes of one lottery are larger than
all outcomes of the other lottery (our third example). Standard models (like CPT)
which are modifications of the “prescriptive benchmark” Expected Utility Theory,
handle such clear situations with ease, e.g., all of these models (even the mean-
value) will predict correctly in the three initial examples. This is the reason, why
experiments are usually performed only in unclear situations: all experimental data
came from lotteries different from our first and third examples, and all but one
experiment (the randomized data by Erev, Roth, Slonim & Barron (2002)) only
involved choosing between lotteries of which the expected values were close to
each other, unlike our second example.
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In fact, in at least one experiment the expected values of all pairs of lotteries
were exactly the same. Let us have a closer look on this particular data set: Tver-
sky & Kahneman (1992) measured the certainty equivalent of simple two-outcome
lotteries. Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) use this data to derive a measurement on the
preference between the lottery and its expected return. (If the certainty equivalent
is less than the expected return, that would mean that people would prefer the ex-
pected return, otherwise they would prefer the lottery.) This conclusion is right, but
obviously it only uses a small portion of the information in the data. Moreover, it
takes only comparisons of lotteries into account where the expected values agree.
We can illustrate this problem on an example from physics: Newton’s theory of
gravitation explains most mechanical problems (like the movement of planets) with
high accuracy. In order to compare Einstein’s relativity theory to Newton’s theory it
is essential to consider cases where both theories differ significantly. Usually this is
the case when extremely large velocities or masses are involved. Most experiments
that aim to distinguish between both theories, will therefore involve extremely large
velocities or masses. This is fine, since Einstein’s theory coincides with Newton’s
theory in the case of small velocities and masses. We do not need to test it there.
Now imagine, a new, very different theory of gravitation were to be developed
which uses a formalism completely different from Newton and Einstein. Then we
would naturally not only have to test it on the old experimental data involving
extremely large velocities or masses. We also have to test it for small velocities
and masses, before we can accept it.
Let us consider a concrete example to better understand the selection process.
Consider 99 different lotteries with a probability of 1%, 2%, . . . , 99% of winning
200 and compare each of these gambles with a sure payoff of 100. In other words,
consider the 99 decision problems:
outcome 0 200
probability 99% 1%
vs. 100, · · · , outcome 0 200
probability 1% 99%
vs. 100.
The predictions of the Expected Value (EV), Expected Utility Theory (EUT), and
Prospect Theory (PT) are in this case:
1. EV predicts that the lottery is preferred as long as the probability of winning
is greater than 50%;
2. EUT predicts that the lottery is preferred as long as the probability of win-
ning is greater than 54% if the utility function is the power function as mea-
sured by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and initial wealth is neglected;
3. PT predicts that the lottery is preferred as long as the probability of winning
is greater than 66% if the value and weighting functions are the same as
measured by Tversky & Kahneman (1992).
As we can see, all three theories agree for high winning probabilities (higher
than 66%) and predict that in this case people would prefer the lottery over the sure
5payoff. They also agree for low winning probabilities (lower than 50%) and predict
that people would prefer the sure payoff. (Compare Fig. 1.) The three theories
disagree, however, regarding the precise cut-off probability, in other words to what
extent people are risk averse. To test the discrepancy between these theories, one
therefore just needs to focus on those lotteries with winning probabilities between
50% and 66%. If we observe a majority to choose the sure payoff in this case, this
would imply that PT has better predictive power than EV.
Now let us look at what the priority heuristic predicts in this example. Since
the difference of the minimum gains is 100 which is larger than the 1/10 of 200,
the priority heuristic would always select the sure payoff regardless of the winning
probability. In the local environment where EV, EUT, and PT are tested, one ex-
pects to observe the majority to be in favor of sure gains if PT is correct. Since the
priority heuristic always selects the sure payoff, it is correct in this local environ-
ment. In the “global environment” of all values from 1% to 99%, however, it fails,
since people prefer in fact the gamble when the winning probability is large. These
cases are, however, not present in the data, as we have just seen.
One can argue that in this case the winning probability can just be rounded up to
100%, so that one would still choose the lottery. But what is the exact rule for this
round-up? Should 80% also be rounded up to 100%, or how about 50%? In the lat-
ter case, the priority heuristic would just be equivalent to EV (in our example). One
can also argue that we should not consider lotteries with high probabilities of win-
ning, i.e., we can set a “boundary condition” to rule out those “trivial” decisions.
But how to set the boundary? If we restrict the priority heuristic only to “difficult”
decisions, namely, lotteries with similar EV (as was suggested in Brandsta¨tter et
al. (2006), page 426), then we need a more difficult “screening” process, i.e., we
need to calculate the EV before deciding whether it is appropriate to apply the pri-
ority heuristic, but this screening process would then destroy the simplicity of the
priority heuristic (as Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) admit, too).
In summary, we should not test a theory which differs completely from Ex-
pected Utility Theory solely on experimental data that was obtained in order to
find subtle differences between people’s actual behavior and the predictions of Ex-
pected Utility Theory. It must also work in cases which are usually not considered,
since the predictions of Expected Utility Theory and people’s behavior coincide on
them.
Let us perform now a more thorough analysis of one particular data set studied
in Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006), which we have already mentioned, namely the one
from Tversky & Kahneman (1992) to demonstrate that the predictive power of
the priority heuristic is substantially reduced when taking more diverse data into
account:
Here two-outcome lotteries are compared with a sure outcome, namely the cer-
tainty equivalent of the lottery, and we know that for exactly this value the average
test person was indifferent, for all lower sure outcomes they preferred the lottery
and for all larger the sure outcome. This means we are in the special case where
we compare a two-outcome lottery X with a certain outcome lottery Y , i.e. m = 2







Typical experimental data 
needed to distinguish 
EV, EUT and PT
1% 99%winning probability
Figure 1: Ranges in which the sure outcome 100 is selected over a lottery with a
potential win of 200. It is clear that the typical experimental data cannot detect the
problems with the priority heuristic for large winning probabilities.
7and n = 1. First, we can simplify the heuristic in this case. Let us assume that
x1 < y1 < x2. (All other cases are uninteresting, since the prediction of the deci-
sion should be clear, although we would like to mention that the priority heuristic
fails in some of these cases, as we have seen in the third example.)
1. In the first step, we choose Y if 110 x2 < y1 − x1. Other cases do not occur.
2. In the second step, we cannot choose Y , since we have q1 = 1 and therefore
p1 > q1 + 110 = 1.1 is not possible.
3. In the third step, we would inevitably choose X, since x2 > y1 by assumption.
Summarizing this, we see that the whole decision procedure reduces to this single
rule:
If 110 x2 < y1 − x1, then choose Y , otherwise choose X. (1)
Using this, we can easily compute the certainty equivalent of a lottery X under the
priority heuristic as




Now we can understand several interesting facts:
• The certainty equivalent (CE) is independent of the probabilities.
• If x1 = 0 then CE is larger than the expected return of X exactly if p1 > 910
and the expected return is larger than CE if and only if p1 < 910 .
• Thus, if we compare X with its expected return, then the heuristic is pre-
dicting that a person is taking the “sure thing” whenever p1 < 910 and the
lottery for p1 > 910 . This agrees qualitatively with the predictions of most
other models (like CPT). If we consider losses as well, this implies the fa-
mous four-fold pattern of risk attitudes: risk averse behavior in gains with
medium/large probabilities and in losses with low probabilities, risk seek-
ing behavior in gains with low probabilities and losses with medium/large
probabilities.
We now also have a nice test of the heuristic at hands: we can compare the
estimated CE with the measured CE2. The average deviation for the heuristic, for
CPT (with the classical functions and parameters of Tversky & Kahneman (1992))
and for the expected value3 is given in Fig. 2. This quantitative comparison shows
2Although the priority heuristic is an ordinal and not a cardinal theory (after all it is meant to deal
with intransitivities as well), it is possible to define a CE of a lottery, as we have just seen. It would
not be correct to infer preferences between lotteries by computing their CE, but we do not intend to
do so.
3We test the expected value, i.e. simply the mean, not the expected utility.
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that the heuristic is not performing well at all on this data. In fact, even the (non-
descriptive and parameter-less) expected value has a much smaller error, so the

















Figure 2: Average deviation between measured CE/x2 in the data of Tversky &
Kahneman (1992) and the CE/x2 predicted by the various theories. We see that
the priority heuristic is clearly outperformed not only by CPT, but also by the
(parameter-free) expected value. – A random guess for random data would have
an average deviation of 0.33.
We can illustrate this effect graphically. Assuming that x1 = 0, we get the
following predictions for CE(X)/x2, compared to the actual data, see Fig. 3.
Now we see that the analysis in Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) only reported whether
the CE value is on the correct side of the expected value. This is indeed the case for
the priority heuristic, only the precise value is far away from the measured value.
In other words: the priority heuristic utilizes the fact that experimental data is
usually obtained in situations where one wants to find a difference between Ex-
pected Utility Theory and actual behavior, i.e. risk-averse behavior for medium to
large probabilities of a gain, and risk-seeking behavior for small probabilities of
a gain. We might say, the only thing that the priority heuristic in such situations
does, is to predict the preference for a lottery over a sure outcome whenever the
probability for a gain is low, since then the experimenter usually wants to see such
a behavior and has therefore designed the lottery in a way where he can measure
this deviation from the Expected Utility Theory. (Again, this is a very reasonable
approach to test modifications of Expected Utility Theory, like CPT, but it is not























Figure 3: Measured values for CE/x2 in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and the
predicted values of CE/x2 by the theories under consideration. (All theories give
predictions which are independent of x2.)
was not tailor-made in this way, the priority heuristic scores quite mediocrely, as
we have seen from the measurements of the certainty equivalent. The observation
that the priority heuristic does not work well when the expected values of the lot-
teries disagree was already made by Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006). Our analysis shows
why this is the case and explains why the data analysis in Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006)
seems to imply that the priority heuristic outperforms standard theories also in the
“general” case, i.e. on classical experimental data.
To understand the shortfalls of the heuristic in a different way, we can also
introduce another heuristic which is much simpler than the priority heuristic, and
which applies to the same class of lotteries, namely lotteries with up to two out-
comes. In this heuristic, we normalize the lower outcome to zero and then simply
divide the larger outcome by 10. We use the result as a “value” of the lottery.
When comparing two lotteries, we choose the one with the larger value.
Since this heuristic is very fast (it actually contains only one step) we call it
“fast-forward heuristic” (FF-heuristic). What are the properties of this FF-heuristic?
First, we notice that, in the simplest case of comparing a two-outcome lottery with
a sure outcome, the FF-heuristic completely agrees with the priority heuristic. We
have already seen this, since we have shown that the priority heuristic reduces in
this case to the rule (1) which is nothing else than the mathematical expression
for the FF-heuristic. This implies that the FF-heuristic can explain the four-fold
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pattern of risk attitudes as well as the priority heuristic, and that the quantitative
analysis for the data by Tversky and Kahneman in Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) applies
completely to the FF-heuristic. This ensures that the FF-heuristic scores as high as
the priority heuristic in the corresponding ranking in Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006),
although the FF-heuristic is obviously much simpler than the priority heuristic.
That in more complicated situations the priority heuristic might score better can be
readily explained with the surplus on simplicity of the new heuristic4.
Have we now found out how people really decide about lotteries? Of course
not, since again the detailed analysis of this section shows that the results of the
FF-heuristic are not as good as they look like: the FF-heuristic is equivalent to
the priority heuristic in predicting certainty equivalents and therefore gives as bad
predictions as the priority heuristic. The FF-heuristic is therefore unmasked as
what it really is: a gross oversimplification that works in a very narrow range of
cases, but fails completely in general cases.
2 A general model for simple heuristics
Sometimes a look from a different angle helps to get a hold on concepts. Let us
therefore have a look on the problem of finding simple heuristics for a decision
under risk in a theoretical way. Of course, we are not talking here about finding out
what heuristics people actually use, this cannot be done by theoretical considera-
tions alone. (Gone are the times of Aristotle.) However, one might make progress
on understanding “as-if” models and their possibilities by studying the theoretical
structure behind them.
For this exposition, we restrict our analysis to a comparison of two lotteries
with two outcomes each. In this case we have essentially six parameters to deal
with (x1, x2, y1, y2, p1, q1), where p1 and q1 are the probabilities for the lower out-
come in the first and second lottery, respectively5. In this “six-dimensional con-
figuration space” the actual decision behavior of a person separates the space into
three subsets: one set of comparisons where he prefers the lottery X, one subset
where he prefers Y and one where he is indifferent. A model for decisions under
risk also performs such a separation, but can obviously only aim to approximate
the “real life” distribution as well as possible.
4We could also come up with yet another heuristic as follows: we prefer any lottery over any
sure outcome whenever the probability for obtaining the larger outcome of the lottery is less than
1/10 – independently on the amount of the outcomes! This is now really counterintuitive, but under
the constraints that the lower outcome is zero and the sure outcome is the expected return of the
lottery, this counterintuitive heuristic suddenly becomes equivalent to the FF-heuristic and to the
priority heuristic. Hence this quite unreasonable heuristic works as well in explaining the four-fold
pattern of risk attitudes and all experimental data directly connected to it. In a certain sense, this new
heuristic is nothing else than this four-fold pattern, an insight which reduces this observation to a
mere tautology.
5In the general case of lotteries for up to n outcomes, the problem would be 2n + 2(n − 1)-
dimensional, but the remaining considerations are the same.
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Models like CPT use a relatively complicated nonlinear functional to do this
separation. Simple heuristics in the sense of Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) try to do
it only with rules which are linear in the parameters, since they argue that people
do not multiply probabilities and outcomes, and hence a linear model should be
superior in describing their preferences. Such linear rules like “If p1 > q1+ 110 , then
choose Y .” correspond to separations along hyperplanes6 in the configurational
space, since they are nothing else than linear inequalities.
If we build an algorithm like the priority heuristic, then we define the deci-
sion in each step on some subset of the configuration space which is bounded by
a hyperplane. Taking everything together we have a decomposition of the config-
urational space into the three decision sets (prefer X, prefer Y , indifferent) along
pieces of hyperplanes. The number of steps we use in our algorithm determines
the complexity of the final sets, but they are in any case piecewise bounded by
hyperplanes.
This is all very abstract, and since we cannot really get a geometric represen-
tation of a six-dimensional configurational space in this two-dimensional article,
we take a closer look on a special case to illustrate our ideas. We set y1 = y2 and
x1 = 0, i.e., the first lottery has a lower outcome of zero, and the second is a sure
thing with outcome y1. In this case, we have only three parameters left: x2, p1, y1.
How do the decision sets look like in this case?
For the priority heuristic we can easily see from our considerations above that
the sets “choose X” and “choose Y” are separated by the plane y1 = 110 x2. This is in
particular independent of p1. The expected return, on the other hand, leads to the
separation set y1 = x2(1 − p1). Some experimental data can be found in Tversky
& Kahneman (1992) where the CE of two-outcome lotteries have been measured:
y1(x2, p2) corresponds simply to the CE of a lottery defined by x2 and p2. Not
surprisingly, the (interpolated) data does not lie on a plane and is not independent
of the probability p2, as one can see already from Fig. 3.
That the data does not follow a plane, does not mean that there cannot be a
heuristic explaining this data, it only means that the priority heuristic fails to ex-
plain it, and we have seen this already above. However, the highly nonlinear dis-
tribution of the data points would have to be approximated by a small number of
planes which seems to be difficult. If we apply further restrictions to the choice of
the planes (e.g. we only allow for coefficients like 1, 2, 5, 10, . . . ), the task seems
to be quite impossible.
Summarizing, we see that actual behavior corresponds to a highly nonlinear
situation, where linear approximations seem to be inadequate: we might capture a
couple of cases with a linear model, but we will always fail to obtain a reasonably
complete picture.
6The multi-dimensional analogue of planes.
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3 Priority Heuristic – “as-if” model or actual behavior?
We have seen that the priority heuristic is not very accurate as an “as-if” model. But
can it at least model the decision process in humans better than the usual models,
like CPT?
Of course nobody assumes that people have a CPT-calculator in their brains.
But is it more reasonable to assume that they have a priority heuristic algorithm in
their brains? If people really behaved according to this heuristic, what would that
imply? First, people would not integrate the information of a lottery (outcomes
and probabilities), but consider them only separately. This is an assumption that
seems to us a little oversimplifying regarding the quite complex decision process
that people follow when deciding about lotteries – but we admit that people might
be less complex than we think. Second, intermediate outcomes would not be con-
sidered at all7. This is clearly false, as can be seen, e.g., from stochastic dominance
violation examples (Birnbaum 2005) or simply our first example. Third, one would
predict a large increase in decision time when people have to consider more steps
of the heuristic. However, the data provided on this on page 423 in Brandsta¨tter
et al. (2006) shows that the ratio (for lotteries with two outcomes) is 9.3 to 10.1
seconds. This would mean that the first step takes approximately ten times as long
as the following two steps together, and that these two last steps are performed in
only 0.8 seconds. Even taking into account the time it takes to read and understand
the decision, before the actual decision process can start, this seems to be a strong
indicator that people actually do not follow the priority heuristic.
There are also direct ways to elicit the actual decision process as seen by sub-
jects, e.g. tracking of information search patterns, verbal reports etc. These ad-
ditional process data are important to reveal the real decision process. We would
like to mention Johnson & Schkade (1989) who recorded verbal protocols when
deciding on certainty– and probability equivalent. They found in their context
that some subjects actually use heuristics, including probability-outcome tradeoffs,
while others make direct use of the expected value.
In conclusion, we can (up to now) see the priority heuristic only as an “as-
if” model without any clear relation to actual decision processes. And as such an
“as-if” model it predicts some observed facts correctly, but it badly fails in other,
more thorough tests. It is of course not entirely fair to expect the heuristic to
perform better than well-founded, complex models like CPT. One might consider
therefore the heuristic as a surprisingly simple model that guesses decisions of
average persons in specific situations (and only there!) quite well8. Of course,
it would be presumptuous, to assume that people generally follow a simple hard-
wired algorithm when faced with decisions, so it is not surprising that the model
does not work in more general cases.
7As long as we do not extend the model for this case, or restrict its use to two-outcome lotteries,
but then we cannot consider, e.g., Allais’ Paradox.
8Restricting the applicability to these specific situations would lead to good predictive results,
alas every theory is valid if we restrict it to the cases where it is valid!
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So, what can we do with the priority heuristic? Applying it to predict actual
behavior is only possible in certain cases, but there are well-established models
performing well in general situations. They are more complicated to evaluate,
but this is not a significant disadvantage in the age of computers. Applications
of the priority heuristic are also limited to the description of average persons, not
taking into account individual differences. It is also restricted to simple lotteries,
preventing most practical applications, e.g. in finance or economics.
For all of these reasons, we should probably change our view on the priority
heuristic a little. Instead of looking for applications, we should just think of it as a
nice and pretty curiosity that demonstrates the possibilities, but also the limitations,
of simple models in explaining the immense complexity of human behavior.
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